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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1  
Norman Y. Mineta, Sharon Sakamoto, Eileen 
Yoshiko Sakamoto Okada, and Joy Sakamoto Barker 
come forward as amici curiae because they know first-
hand about the dangers—particularly for immigrant 
and minority communities—from government 
exploitation of census data.  The government 
weaponized confidential census data during World 
War II to facilitate the mass removal and 
incarceration of their families and communities.  The 
unlawful and pretextual manner in which the federal 
government has endeavored to add a citizenship 
question to the 2020 decennial census compels amici 
to offer that profoundly troubling historical context to 
inform the Court’s consideration of the questions 
presented. 
Norman Y. Mineta served as Secretary of 
Transportation under President George W. Bush, as 
Secretary of Commerce under President Clinton, as a 
member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 
1975 to 1995, and as mayor of San Jose, California, 
from 1971 to 1975.  Norm’s parents had to respond as 
non-citizens to the 1920, 1930, and 1940 decennial 
censuses because this Court made clear in Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), that his parents—
who emigrated from Japan—were not eligible for 
naturalized citizenship due to their Japanese 
                                            
1 This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties.  
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no person or entity other than amici curiae made a monetary 




ethnicity.  In 1942, when Norm was 10 years old, the 
federal government removed him and his family from 
their home, and incarcerated them with thousands of 
other Japanese Americans—first at the Santa Anita 
racetrack in southern California and then at the Heart 
Mountain camp in Wyoming.  Even though he was a 
young boy at the time, Norm clearly recalls being 
surprised that the federal government was able to so 
quickly round up many Japanese Americans from his 
community on the day of the Pearl Harbor bombing 
and in the months that followed.  Years later, he 
learned that the U.S. Census Bureau had provided 
critical information that facilitated the surveillance of 
Japanese American communities, as well as their 
eventual exclusion and incarceration.  
Sharon Sakamoto, Eileen Yoshiko Sakamoto 
Okada, and Joy Sakamoto Barker are three sisters 
who spent World War II incarcerated at the Minidoka 
concentration camp in Idaho.  Their parents were 
American citizens born and raised in Washington 
State.  Eileen was five years old and Joy was six 
months old when the federal government removed 
them, their parents, and two brothers from their 
Seattle home and sent them all to live in a converted 
horse stall at the Puyallup Fairgrounds south of 
Seattle.  The federal government then moved them to 
Minidoka, where Sharon was born.  Like Norm and his 
family, the Sakamoto family was unaware that the 
Census Bureau cooperated with military authorities 
by identifying where Japanese Americans lived.  
Sharon, Eileen, and Joy join as amici because they are 
deeply concerned that the proposed citizenship 
question on the 2020 decennial census will cause 
immigrants and other persons of color to avoid 
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responding for fear that the information will be used 
to harm them, just as the federal government harmed 
Japanese Americans during World War II. 
The Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR) is the Nation’s largest Muslim American civil 
rights and advocacy organization, and the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations, New York, Inc. (CAIR-
NY) is an independent New York affiliate.  Following 
the tragic attacks of 9/11, CAIR and CAIR-NY aided 
Muslim New Yorkers impacted by the perceived 
misuse of census data.  Shortly after 9/11, at the 
request of what is now U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, the Census Bureau provided a list of U.S. 
cities that had more than 1,000 Arab American 
residents.  Over a year later, it provided a zip-code-
level breakdown of Arab American populations by 
country of origin.  Government officials subsequently 
insisted that the Bureau disclosed this data to help 
notify travelers about currency reporting 
requirements and to improve airport signage.  Muslim 
Americans, however, viewed these post-9/11 
disclosures as pretextual and infected with animus, 
thereby reducing their trust and participation in the 
2010 decennial census.  CAIR and CAIR-NY join as 
amici out of concern that the inclusion of a citizenship 
question in the 2020 decennial census will further 
erode Muslim Americans’ trust and participation.  
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality is a non-profit organization based at the 
Seattle University School of Law.  It works to advance 
justice through research, advocacy, and education.  
Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu—who defied 
military orders during World War II that resulted in 
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the unlawful incarceration of 120,000 Japanese 
Americans—the Korematsu Center works to advance 
social justice for all.  It has a special interest in 
addressing government action that harms classes of 
persons based on race or nationality.2 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decennial census depends on self-reporting 
and can achieve its mandate under the Enumeration 
Clause only when the public trusts that the federal 
government will not misuse collected information.  In 
recognition of that fact, every U.S. President since 
1910 has issued a proclamation reassuring individuals 
and their communities that no harm could result from 
participating in the decennial census.  Toward that 
end, the modern Census Act requires the Secretary of 
Commerce to treat census data as confidential. 
Despite those assurances, the government has 
breached the public’s trust on several occasions 
throughout the Nation’s history—particularly during 
World Wars I and II.  The most notable breach is the 
Census Bureau’s 1942 disclosure of data on the 
whereabouts of Japanese Americans.  The evidence is 
clear—and, indeed, the Bureau now admits—that it 
provided the data that powered the machinery of mass 
removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans 
during World War II.   
The Census Bureau disclosed confidential data to 
wartime authorities out of supposed “military 
urgency,” but the coram nobis cases 40 years later 
                                            
2  The Korematsu Center does not represent the official 
views of Seattle University. 
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demonstrated any such urgency was a lie.  The real 
reason for the government’s deplorable treatment of 
Japanese Americans was a baseless perception of 
disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes. 
As that history demonstrates, the fear that 
census data could be used to harm individuals and 
communities is anything but abstract.  Immigrant 
communities and other communities of color, in 
particular, thus have good reason to be suspicious of 
the government’s decision to include a citizenship 
question on the 2020 decennial census.  The district 
court’s exhaustive post-trial findings confirm that 
suspicion here:  the citizenship question was added 
through a process that the court found to be arbitrary, 
and it was based on a justification that the court found 
to be pretextual. 
The federal judiciary plays a vital role in 
ensuring that improper motives do not infect 
government decisionmaking.  Heeding the lessons of 
the government’s historical exploitation of census 
data, including its misuse of such data to facilitate the 
mass incarceration of Japanese Americans on the 
pretext of national security, this Court should firmly 
reject the government’s attempt once again to escape 
meaningful judicial scrutiny. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PUBLIC TRUST IN THE CENSUS DERIVES 
FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S 
ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL NOT MISUSE 
DATA. 
The promise of data confidentiality is integral to 
the modern Census Bureau’s ability to achieve the 
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“actual Enumeration” required by the U.S. 
Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see, e.g., 
Vincent P. Barabba & D.L. Kaplan, U.S. Census 
Bureau Statistical Techniques To Prevent Disclosure—
The Right of Privacy vs. the Need To Know (1975) 
(“Should the public’s confidence in the Bureau’s pledge 
of confidentiality for their census returns erode, 
goodwill and cooperation will erode.”), quoted in U.S. 
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON STATISTICAL 
DISCLOSURE AND DISCLOSURE-AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES 
32 (1978).  In recognition of the need for public trust, 
the modern Census Act restricts the Secretary’s ability 
to (i) “use the information furnished” by census 
respondents “for any purpose other than the statistical 
purposes for which it is supplied”; (ii) “make any 
publication whereby the data furnished by any 
particular establishment or individual *** can be 
identified”; or (iii) “permit anyone other than the 
sworn officers and employees of the Department or 
bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual 
reports.”  13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(1)-(3). 
The federal government, however, did not always 
seek to protect census data.  For example, to facilitate 
an accurate enumeration in the 1790 decennial 
census, the government posted draft census data in 
public places to shame noncompliant persons and levy 
community pressure on them.  See JASON G. 
GAUTHIER, MEASURING AMERICA:  THE DECENNIAL 
CENSUS FROM 1790 TO 2000, at 129 (2002). 
It was not until the early twentieth century that 
the Census Bureau (created in 1902) adopted a more 
sensible approach of incentivizing participation in the 
decennial census through “guarantees *** designed to 
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assure the public that they can respond candidly to 
government statistical inquiries.”  Margo Anderson & 
William Seltzer, Challenges to the Confidentiality of 
U.S. Federal Statistics, 1910-1965, 23 J. OFFICIAL 
STATS. 1, 1 (2007) (hereinafter “Challenges”).  
President William Howard Taft sought to remove 
politics from the census process by ordering the 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor to promulgate 
regulations to ensure that “the census shall not be 
made to serve the political purposes of any one.”  The 
Census and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, at 8 (Aug. 18, 1909) 
(quoting President Taft’s letter).   
In a similar vein, President Taft issued a 
proclamation in 1910 to assure the public that 
participation in the census would not lead to harm: 
The sole purpose of the census is to secure 
general statistical information *** , and 
replies are required from individuals only in 
order to permit the compilation of such 
general statistics.  The census has nothing 
to do with *** army *** service *** , with the 
regulation of immigration, or with the 
enforcement of any national, state, or local 
law or ordinance, nor can any person be 
harmed in any way by furnishing the 
information required.  There need be no fear 
that any disclosure will be made regarding 
any individual person or his affairs.  
1910 Census Proclamation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU.  The 
sitting U.S. President has delivered a virtually 
identical proclamation for every decennial census 
since then.  Challenges, supra, at 5. 
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Yet the Census Bureau almost immediately 
failed to live up to its promise of confidentiality.  In 
1917, the Bureau disclosed “to courts, draft boards, 
and the Justice Department” the names of thousands 
of draft-age men who failed to register for the Selective 
Service during World War I.  Challenges, supra, at 7.  
In doing so, the Bureau’s Director concluded that 
“statistical confidentiality should be conditioned and 
compromised by more apparently pressing 
government needs.”  Id.   
Unsurprisingly, the floodgates opened:  “[O]nce 
census officials supported the initial release of 
information to draft boards in 1917, officials in other 
agencies, for example in the Justice Department, 
asked for further releases.”  Challenges, supra, at 10.  
“[I]n early 1920, while the enumerators were in the 
field, the Justice Department, on behalf of the 
Department of Labor, asked if the local enumerators 
in Toledo, Ohio, could provide information about 
individuals’ citizenship from the 1920 Census of 
Population *** for use in deportation cases.”  Id. at 8 
(ellipsis in original) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
After World War I, Census Bureau Directors 
William Mott Steuart (1921-1933) and William Lane 
Austin (1933-1941) viewed regaining public trust 
through data confidentiality as paramount.  See 
Challenges, supra, at 9-10, 16.  But by 1941, as the 
United States faced the prospect of World War II, 
President Franklin Roosevelt “sought a mechanism to 
permit the administrative and intelligence agencies 
access to individual level information collected by the 
U.S. Census Bureau.”  Id. at 16.  President Roosevelt 
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“involuntarily retired” Director Austin and nominated 
a more compliant director, who immediately 
“authorized the Commerce Secretary to provide 
officials in other government agencies access to 
confidential census data for the ‘national defense 
program.’”  Id. at 17.  Within a year, Congress passed 
the Second War Powers Act of 1942, which stated 
“[t]hat notwithstanding any other provision of law, *** 
data *** in the possession of the Department of 
Commerce or any bureau or division thereof, may be 
made available *** to any branch or agency of the 
Government *** for use in connection with the conduct 
of the war.”  Pub. L. No. 77-507, § 1402, 56 Stat. 176, 
186-187.  That Act temporarily suspended the existing 
statutory confidentiality protection for census data.  
13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1940). 
Requests for the Census Bureau to share census 
data continued during the postwar period.  For 
instance, a few years after the end of World War II, 
“the Attorney General’s Office sought information 
from census records about certain individuals for use 
by the FBI in the context of rising concern about 
possible Communist infiltration and sabotage.”  
Challenges, supra, at 25 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  To be sure, for a period 
beginning in 1962, the “Bureau effectively resisted any 
federal agency requests for access to individual reports 
for the purpose of taxation, investigation or 
regulation.”  Id. at 28.  But in 2001, the Bureau 
facilitated the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security’s post-9/11 access to data from the 2000 
decennial census concerning the 5-digit postal codes of 
Arab Americans.  Id.  And “[a]s during the world wars, 
there is much discussion today in the United States 
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about coordination of government information and 
efficiency.”  Id. at 30. 
The upshot of these examples is that many 
Americans—particularly those from immigrant and 
minority communities—have reason to distrust how 
the government might use responses to a citizenship 
question, which could suppress response rates and 
degrade the quality of the data gathered.  Past 
experience has also eroded confidence in the 
effectiveness of “ethical safeguards *** to deter the 
most likely and persistent ‘intruders,’ that is, other 
agencies of government with investigative, 
intelligence, or prosecutorial agendas.”  Challenges, 
supra, at 29.  In today’s age, where national security 
and other exigencies have brought the issue of census 
data confidentiality back to the fore, it is imperative 
that the decennial census be administered in a 
manner that eliminates any concern that data will be 
wielded against those who provide responses. 
II. THE MASS INCARCERATION OF 
JAPANESE AMERICANS, FACILITATED 
BY CENSUS DATA AND PRETEXT, SERVES 
AS A CAUTIONARY TALE. 
A. The Government Used Census Data To 
Incarcerate Japanese Americans 
During World War II. 
One of the most glaring and heinous examples of 
the Census Bureau’s violation of the public trust 
occurred during World War II:  the Bureau played a 
central role in the mass removal and incarceration of 
over 120,000 Japanese Americans during the spring of 
1942.  “The historical record is clear that senior 
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Census Bureau staff proactively cooperated with the 
internment, and that census tabulations were directly 
implicated[.]”  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POLICY OFFICE, A 
MONOGRAPH OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY IN THE 
U.S. CENSUS 16 (July 2001) (hereinafter “CENSUS 
BUREAU MONOGRAPH”).   
Most directly, the Census Bureau now admits to 
“providing 1940 census data on Japanese Americans” 
to the War Department, specifically the Western 
Defense Command, “for small geographic areas down 
to the census tract and block levels.”  CENSUS BUREAU 
MONOGRAPH, supra, at 15.  In February 1942, the 
Bureau deployed the head of its statistical research 
division, Calvert Dedrick, “to the Western Defense 
Command to assist in the implementation of the 
evacuations.”  Margo Anderson, Public Management of 
Big Data:  Historical Lessons from the 1940s, FED. 
HIST. 17, 22 (2015) (hereinafter “Public 
Management”).  Dedrick later testified that the 
Western Defense Command asked him for “a detailed 
cross-tabulation for even the most minute areas,” such 
as “cities by blocks.”  William Seltzer & Margo 
Anderson, After Pearl Harbor:  The Proper Role of 
Population Data Systems in Time of War 7 (Mar. 28, 
2000) (unpublished draft).  Dedrick agreed and 
provided unpublished data that allowed the Western 
Defense Command “to find where the citizens of 
Japanese descent lived” and to identify “exactly the 
city blocks where the people of Japanese descent 
lived.”  Public Management, supra, at 29-30 (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
Contemporaneous evidence confirms the Census 
Bureau’s admission.  In 1943, U.S. General John L. 
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DeWitt, Commander of the Western Defense, 
authored what the government offered as the 
military’s official account of the wartime removal and 
incarceration.  J.L. DeWitt, Final Report:  Japanese 
Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (June 5, 1943) 
(hereinafter “Final Report”).  General DeWitt detailed 
how the Bureau performed a “special tabulation” of 
1940 decennial census data for the Western Defense 
Command, which “plotted on maps” the “total number 
of Japanese individuals and families *** for each 
census tract.”  Id. at 86.  Specifically, the Bureau 
provided “tables” showing “various city blocks where 
the Japanese lived and *** how many were living in 
each block.”  REPORT OF THE CWRIC, PERSONAL 
JUSTICE DENIED 105 n.* (The Civil Liberties Public 
Education Fund & University of Washington Press, 
1997).   
That information allowed the Western Defense 
Command to round up Japanese Americans—what 
General DeWitt referred to as the “logistics of 
evacuation”—with swift and surgical precision.  Final 
Report, supra, at 356.  Indeed, General DeWitt 
concluded that “[t]he most important single source of 
information prior to the evacuation was the 1940 
Census of Population,” which “became the basis for the 
general evacuation and relocation plan.”  Id. at 352; 
see also id. at 79 (census data was “[o]f prime 
importance in shaping the evacuation procedure”).  
Beyond sharing data with the Western Defense 
Command, the Census Bureau disclosed information 
about individual Japanese Americans to federal 
agencies.  William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, Census 
Confidentiality Under the Second War Powers Act 
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(1942-1947), at 5 (Mar. 12, 2007) (unpublished draft).  
In 1943, pursuant to the Second War Powers Act, the 
U.S. Treasury Department requested from the 
Commerce Department “a list of the Japanese residing 
in the Metropolitan Area of Washington, D.C., as 
reported in the 1940 Census, including information as 
to addresses.”  Id. at 16 & fig. 1.  The Commerce 
Department complied within seven days, creating a 
spreadsheet that listed the “name, address, sex, age, 
marital status, citizenship status, status in 
employment, and occupation and industry” of 79 
Japanese Americans.  Id. at 21-22 & figs. 5a-b.  The 
rapidity of the disclosure demonstrates that “the 
Bureau not only provided identifiable micro-data on 
Japanese Americans to other federal agencies but also 
had well-developed procedures to do so expeditiously.”  
Id. at 24.  Thus, at the very least, the 1943 
Washington, D.C. disclosure is strong evidence that 
“lists of Japanese Americans from the 1940 Census 
were provided to assist in the mopping up stages of the 
round-up of Japanese Americans on the West Coast.”  
Id. at 40.  
The foregoing lays bare how the federal 
government used the 1940 decennial census for the 
purpose of finding and incarcerating Japanese 
Americans, despite President Roosevelt’s 1940 
proclamation that “[t]here need be no fear that any 
disclosure will be made regarding any individual 
person or his affairs” and that “[n]o person can be 
harmed in any way by furnishing the information 
required.”  Proclamation 2385:  Sixteenth Decennial 
Census (Feb. 9, 1940), in 1940 SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 26-27 (1941).  This 
shameful episode from our Nation’s history provides 
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real-world context for Respondents’ concern that the 
Census Bureau will use citizenship data for improper 
purposes or in ways that will harm them or their 
communities. 
B. The Japanese American Incarceration 
Cases Are Powerful Reminders That 
This Court Must Be Vigilant In Policing 
Pretext. 
In addition to asking the Court to remember the 
use of census data during World War II, amici ask the 
Court to uphold the district court’s searching inquiry 
into the government’s stated reason for adding the 
citizenship question to the 2020 decennial census and 
to ensure that the reason is not pretextual.  In the 
Japanese American incarceration cases, the Court 
failed to scrutinize the government’s claim that its 
actions were necessary, and 40 years later, it was 
discovered that the government’s reasons were a 
pretext for discrimination.  The Court should 
remember the lesson of those cases.  It should 
scrutinize the government’s proffered justification 
here (including by subjecting decisionmakers to 
discovery), and it should affirm the district court’s 
conclusion—based on scores of post-trial factual 
findings—that the Secretary of Commerce concealed 
his true motivation for adding the citizenship 
question. 
The district court held that “the sole rationale” 
the government “articulated for [its] decision—that a 
citizenship question is needed to enhance [the 
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Voting Rights Act 
(VRA)] enforcement efforts—was pretextual.”  Pet. 
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App. 320a.3   In particular, the district court found 
several facts demonstrating that the government 
made its decision “well before” the DOJ’s request for a 
citizenship question “and for reasons unrelated to the 
VRA.”  Id. at 313a.  Worse still, “the record also 
includes evidence of the many ways in which Secretary 
Ross and his aides sought to conceal” the decision to 
add the citizenship question.  Id. at 314a. 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exists 
precisely so that Article III courts can ferret out and 
invalidate such agency action.  It confers upon courts 
the essential responsibility to “set aside agency action” 
that is “not in accordance with law” or “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.”  5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).  And it is a core tenet of APA 
review that an agency decisionmaker must “disclose 
the basis of” decision.  Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); see also 
Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 
80, 94 (1943) (“[T]he process of review requires that 
the grounds upon which the administrative agency 
acted be clearly disclosed[.]”).  Pretextual 
decisionmaking is anathema to those principles. 
The Solicitor General nonetheless invites this 
Court to insulate the Secretary’s action from APA 
review altogether.  Gov’t Br. 21-28.  As a fallback, the 
                                            
3  Significantly, the only other court to consider this 
question also found that the Secretary’s rationale was pretextual.  
See State v. Ross, No. 18-CV-01865-RS, 2019 WL 1052434, at *48 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (“Together, this evidence establishes that 
Defendants intended to use the VRA enforcement as a pretext for 
adding the citizenship question when VRA enforcement was not, 
in fact, their true purpose.”).   
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Solicitor General argues that the district court’s 
pretext finding “defies fundamental principles 
governing APA review of agency action” because it 
puts the focus on an unstated justification not in the 
administrative record.  Id. at 40-45.  Relatedly, the 
Solicitor General seeks to shield decisionmakers from 
having to reveal their true intentions in discovery.  Id. 
at 55. 
As the Japanese American incarceration cases 
poignantly demonstrate, the costs of allowing the 
actual justifications for government action to go 
undetected—or even unchecked—are unmeasurably 
high.  There, the government argued that the wartime 
orders resulting in the incarceration of 120,000 
persons of Japanese ancestry—two-thirds of whom 
were American citizens—were justified by military 
necessity because those persons posed a threat of 
espionage and sabotage.  See Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), conviction vacated 828 F.2d 
591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 
115 (1943), conviction vacated 772 F.2d 1496, 1498 
(9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), conviction vacated 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413 
(N.D. Cal. 1984).  This Court infamously deferred, 
reasoning that “it is not for any court to sit in review 
of the wisdom of the[] action or [to] substitute its 
judgment for [the decisionmakers’].”  Hirabayashi, 320 
U.S. at 93; see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (same). 
Forty years later, coram nobis petitions revealed 
that the government had engaged in “the suppression 
of evidence which established *** the real reason for 
the exclusion order,” and instead had provided this 
Court a false and pretextual record to support the 
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mass exclusion of Japanese Americans.  Hirabayashi, 
828 F.2d at 604.  Although the government had 
represented that the immediate round-up of Japanese 
Americans was necessary because there was 
insufficient time to separate the loyal from the 
disloyal, General DeWitt’s Final Report originally said 
no such thing.  Id. at 596, 598.  Instead, it took the 
racist and revealing position that one could never 
separate the “sheep from the goats” because Japanese 
Americans were inherently disloyal on account of their 
“ties of race, intense feeling of filial piety and *** 
strong bonds of common tradition, culture and 
customs.”  Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 
1445, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1986).  When it was 
discovered that the Report contradicted the 
government’s argument, the government ordered the 
Report revised and destroyed the original versions.  
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598-599. 
The government also failed to apprise this Court 
of intelligence reports from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), and the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) that refuted the government’s claim 
of military necessity.  Justice Department attorney 
John L. Burling attempted to insert a footnote into the 
government’s brief in Korematsu, stating that General 
DeWitt’s “recital” with respect to “the use of illegal 
radio transmitters and shore-to-ship signaling by 
persons of Japanese ancestry” were “in conflict with 
information in the possession of the Department of 
Justice.”  Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis 
and internal citation omitted).  His memorandum to 
Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler stated:  
“General DeWitt’s report makes flat statements 
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concerning radio transmitters and ship-to-shore 
signaling which are categorically denied by the FBI 
and by the [FCC].  There is no doubt that these 
statements were intentional falsehoods.”  Id. at 1424.  
The footnote as filed, however, did the opposite of what 
Burling recommended in “ask[ing] the Court to take 
judicial notice” of “the justification for the evacuation.”  
Br. of U.S. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1944). 
Similarly, the ONI’s Kenneth Ringle wrote a 
report concluding that there was no basis for mass 
incarceration.  See Lt. Comm. Kenneth D. Ringle to 
Chief of Naval Operations, Report on Japanese 
Question (Jan. 26, 1942), in File ASW 014.311, RG 
107, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.  
Justice Department attorney Edward Ennis urged the 
Solicitor General to disclose the report to this Court, 
but “[n]otwithstanding [his] plea, the *** brief in 
Hirabayashi made no mention of Ringle’s analysis.”  
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 602 n.11.  The Solicitor 
General finally confessed error for this conduct in 
2011.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error:  The 
Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese 
American Internment Cases (May 20, 2011). 
These well-chronicled events make all-too-
concrete the concern that the government’s stated 
rationale for pursuing a particular end may be cut 
from whole cloth.  The APA empowers courts to 
evaluate the government’s justification in real time, 
rather than discover 40 years later that it was 
pretextual. 
* * * 
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Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are painful 
yet powerful reminders not only of the need for 
constant vigilance in protecting our fundamental 
values, but also of the essential role of Article III 
courts as guardians against pretextual government 
action.  Rather than repeat the failures of the past, 
this Court should repudiate them and affirm the 
greater legacy of those cases:  Blind deference to the 
Executive Branch’s stated rationale is incompatible 
with the protection of fundamental freedoms.  
Accordingly, this Court should reject the government’s 
invitation to abdicate its critical role to root out pretext 
under the APA; subject the government’s reason for 
adding a citizenship question to the 2020 decennial 
census to searching judicial scrutiny; and stand as a 
bulwark against government action that threatens 




For the foregoing reasons, the Court should 
affirm the judgment below.  
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